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In recent years, community forestry has emerged as a means to reform power constellations with 
regard to forest governance. Through community forestry, the central state promised to devolve 
several forest rights to local communities and encouraged them to get involved in decision mak-
ing processes and the implementation of forest activities. However, experience in some countries 
indicates that the implementation of community forestry programmes is rarely followed by genuine 
power devolution to local forest users. Instead, these programmes may even serve as a means to 
retain or restore the central state’s control over forests. Using a case study of a community forestry 
programme implemented in Java, Indonesia, by a state forest company, this paper argues that the 
implementation of community forestry is also driven by the state’s interests to regain control over 
the forests. Research in eight villages in Central Java province reveals that the community forestry 
programmes are carefully structured according to numerous administrative procedures and estab-
lish a mode of control through a bureaucratic design.
Keywords: Administrative Procedures; Community Forestry; Indonesia; State Control; State Forestland
In den letzten Jahren hat sich community forestry als Mittel zur Reform von Machtkonstellationen 
in Bezug auf die Verwaltung von Wäldern herausgebildet. Der Zentralstaat versprach durch commu-
nity forestry bestimmte Waldrechte an lokale Communities abzugeben und ermutigte sie, sich an 
Entscheidungsprozessen und der Implementierung von Forstaktivitäten zu beteiligen. Erfahrungen 
in einigen Ländern zeigen jedoch, dass die Implementierung von community forestry-Programmen 
selten mit einem tatsächlichen Machttransfer an lokale ForstnutzerInnen einhergeht, sondern diese 
Programme sogar als Mittel zur Rückgewinnung von zentralstaatlicher Kontrolle über Wälder dienen 
können. Anhand eines Fallbeispiels eines community forestry-Programms, das in Java, Indonesien, 
von einem staatlichen Forstunternehmen implementiert wird, argumentiere ich in diesem Artikel, 
dass die Implementierung von community forestry auch von den Interessen des Staates, Kontrolle 
über die Wälder zurückzugewinnen, vorangetrieben wird. Meine Forschung in acht Dörfern in der 
Provinz Zentral-Java zeigt, dass die community forestry-Programme sorgfältig nach zahlreichen 
administrativen Verfahren strukturiert sind und eine Art der Kontrolle durch bürokratisches Design 
etablieren.
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Introduction
Over the past decade, there have been calls for the devolution of forest control from 
the central state to local communities. The calls were principally driven by concerns 
about the absolute control by the central state – particularly in the developing world 
– over forest resources and their uses (Agrawal & Gibson, 1999; Assembe Mvondo, 
2009; Gilmour & Fisher, 1991; Shackleton, Campbell, Wollenberg, & Edmunds, 2002; 
Webb 2008). The implementation of community forestry in recent years has been a 
starting point in reforming the power constellations in forest governance (Acharya, 
2002; Lachapelle, Smith, & McCool, 2004; Nygren, 2005; Ostrom, 1999). Communi-
ty forestry promised to devolve several forest rights to local communities and en-
courage them to get involved in decision making processes and the implementation 
of forest activities from reforestation to harvesting. For example, McDermott and 
Schrekenberg (2009, p. 158) elaborate that community forestry comprises local peo-
ple’s exercise of power to influence decisions regarding the management of forests, 
including the rules of access and the disposition of products. 
Many countries across the globe have experimented with different programmes 
that included the participation of local people and that formally mentioned power 
devolution as one of the core policy goals (Bull & White, 2002; Gilmour, Malla, & 
Nurse, 2004). However, there is an increasing pool of studies (for instance Agrawal 
& Ostrom, 2008; Blaikie 2006; Dahal & Capastrino, 2006; Larson, 2005; Ribot, 2004, 
2009) that indicate that the implementation of such models is rarely followed by 
genuine power devolution to local forest users. Experiences in many countries, for 
instance, Indonesia, Nepal, the Philippines, Senegal, Uganda, Bolivia, and Nicaragua 
indicate that community forestry programmes may even serve as a means to retain 
or restore the central state’s control over the forests (see Devkota, 2010; Gauld, 2000; 
Ribot, Agrawal, & Larson, 2006). This paper will further support the aforementioned 
findings on the informal (hidden) agenda of states in implementing community for-
estry. Using a case study of a programme implemented in Java, Indonesia, Pengelo-ASEAS 5(2)
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laan Hutan Bersama Masyarakat (PHBM), by the state-owned company of Perhutani, 
this paper argues that the implementation of the PHBM is also driven by the state’s 
interest in regaining control over the forests. It reveals that PHBM is carefully struc-
tured according to numerous administrative procedures – based on a bureaucratic 
design – that serve as a mode of control by the forest administration over the forest-
land and its resources. 
Theoretical Framework
This paper uses theories from political science, which principally focus on the concept 
of control and the mechanisms used for its enforcement. In political science, the term 
control usually describes the relationship between a political authority (principal) and 
the subordinate/agent (Moe, 2002). It frequently centres on how the former devises a 
structure of rules so that the latter’s policy actions are pursued accordingly (Bendor, 
1988, cited in Moe, 2002, p. 2), depicting power relations in which the position of the for-
mer dominates the latter’s “in terms of great mastery of rules” (Offe, 1976, p. 25). Rangan 
(1997) defines control as the ability of the principal to check and direct the behaviour of 
the agent. This definition mirrors Weber’s notion of domination (Ribot & Peluso, 2003, p. 
159). On the other hand, the degree of control that the agent experiences correlates with 
“the variability of autonomy, and freedom from direction” (Clegg, 1981, p. 545).
For this analysis it is important to understand how control is imposed. Extensive 
discussions in behavioural research often centre on whether the principal pursues 
ex post or ex ante control in order to achieve the action’s desired outcomes (see e.g. 
Kamin & Rachlinski, 1995; Kolstad, Ulen, & Johnson, 1990). The ex post mechanism, 
which focuses on direct supervision such as police patrols, remains a popular strat-
egy for enforcing legal norms (Kraakman, 1986). It involves monitoring, observing 
the subordinate’s actual behaviour, rewarding, and punishing in cases of misconduct 
(McCubbins, Noll, & Weingast, 1987, p. 244). Several political scientists (e.g. Kraak-
man, 1986; Leatherwood & Spector, 1991; McCubbins et al., 1987) raise the limitations 
of direct monitoring, particularly its associated costs and limited coverage. In the 
absence of effective enforcing capacity, direct oversight appears to offer limited ad-
vantages for the principal to check and direct an agent’s behaviour. 
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Therfore, McCubbins et al. (1987) argue that administrative procedures (ex ante) 
offer a cheaper and more effective approach for the principal to exert control over 
the agent. The mechanism depends on “stacking the decks” to guide “an agency to 
make decisions that are consistent with the preferences” of the principal (McCub-
bins, Noll, & Weingast, 1989, p. 432). Here, political control is exercised through the 
design of bureaucracy and pursued by establishing rules and requirements, impos-
ing decision procedures and criteria, and constraining the agent from moving in the 
direction it desires (Moe, 2002). The structure and process mechanism is expected to 
limit the independence of an agent to make policy actions (Bawn, 1995, p. 62; McCub-
bins et al., 1987, p. 244), and if the structures and processes are properly designed, an 
agent’s behaviour “will be largely under control from the outset” (Moe, 2002, p. 3).
The Decline of State Control and PHBM Community Forestry
The state forests of Java comprise about 3 million hectares, more than four-fifths of 
which are administered and managed by the state forest company Perhutani. Unlike 
most forest companies in Indonesia, Perhutani is autonomous. It directly controls 
and uses the forest resources, while it also determines forest management, exploita-
tion, marketing as well as protection (Maryudi, 2011). 
Prior to the economic and political crises that struck the country between 1997 and 
1998, the forest administration and state-company’s management were based on the 
forestry model established by the colonial administration, which adopted a state-con-
trol approach comprised of an exclusionary policy vis-à-vis the local population. Peluso 
(1992) describes this centralistic forest tradition at great length. The centralistic model 
was based on control over the state’s forestland and resources as well as local people’s 
activities in the forests (Peluso, 1992). In this regard, the state’s ownership of forestland 
was a fundamental element as this represents “a broader set of practices and ideas 
related to ‘best management’ of forest production or protection” (Peluso, 2011, p. 814). 
Ensuring ownership means that the state captures the greatest amount of benefits 
from forest products. To ensure control, the forest office relied on direct surveillance, 
and the forest police became the core component of the forest company, complement-
ing the managerial and technical lines (Peluso, 1992; Peluso & Poffenberger, 1989). A 
)ASEAS 5(2)
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formal forest policy highlighted the importance of the forest police that was put in 
charge of securing and guarding the state’s rights over forest resources (Peluso, 1993a).
The strong centralistic forest traditions effectively prohibited local communities’ 
access to forest resources. The only legal access granted to local communities was 
the short-term (usually two years) taungya-styled agroforestry, locally referred to 
as tumpangsari, in which local people were allowed to cultivate agricultural crops 
in between the main forest species during reforestation (Bratamihardja, Sunito, & 
Kartasubrata, 2005). However, as Peluso (1993b) notes, this centralistic state con-
trol has significantly declined. Over the past few decades, the state forest company 
has experienced numerous forest problems, for example, forest land encroachment, 
forest thefts, and agricultural cultivation (Djajanti, 2006; Djamhuri, 2008; Nawir & 
Rumboko, 2007; Peluso, 1993b; Purwanto, Ito, & Oohata, 2003). Some groups of local 
people have also attempted to claim ownership rights over some parts of the forests 
(see Maryudi & Krott, 2012a). These problems have led to massive forest degrada-
tion, mirrored by the high proportion of young forest stands and barren forestlands 
(Nawir, Murniati, Rumboko, Hiyama, & Gumartini, 2007). At the time of the afore-
mentioned political crisis, conflicts and unrest related to forestry occurred in many 
forest regions (see Wulan, Yasmi, Purba, & Wollenberg, 2004). Furthermore, political 
struggles over the control of forests emerged as some district governments attempt-
ed to dethrone the superiority of Perhutani in administering the state forests in their 
regions (Adi et al., 2004; Nomura, 2008).2 
The accumulated forest problems urged the state company to adopt a new ap-
proach through the implementation of community forestry. While there have been 
experiments with community forestry in Java for more than three decades (see Pelu-
so, 1993b), a formal policy on community forestry was finally launched in 2001. PHBM 
community forestry serves as a generic model implemented for all forests under the 
administration of Perhutani. It rests on joint forest management between Perhutani 
and local community institutions – usually at the village level – that formally encour-
ages both parties and other interested stakeholders to share roles in decision making 
2   The downfall of the New Order regime in 1998 has provided pathways for legal and institutional reform. Since 
then, there has been a period of intense struggle over the administrative authority of forests between national 
and local (provincial and district) governments. This resulted in the enactment of two fundamental laws – Law 
22/1999 on Regional Governance and Law 25/1999 on Fiscal Balancing between the Central Government and Regional 
Governments, which both delegate substantial authority, including forestry, to district governments. However, 
decentralisation in the forestry sector occcured mainly in regions outside Java. This means that Perhutani remains 
the authority over most forests in Java.
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processes, the implementation of forest activities, and eventually the benefits from 
forest resources. In addition, PHBM formally aims to integrate socio-economic com-
munity development in forest management systems from which local communities 
can access economic benefits in order to improve the community’s welfare (Mar-
yudi & Krott, 2012b). Under the programme, forest users are required to organise 
themselves as a forest user group3 at the village level, widely referred to as Lembaga 
Masyarakat Desa Hutan (LMDH), to implement the PHBM.
Research Sites and Methodology
The research for this paper was conducted in eight villages that have formally imple-
mented PHBM in three of Perhutani’s forest districts in Central Java: Randublatung, 
South Kedu, and Pemalang. Prior to PHBM implementation, Perhutani’s forests in 
the villages suffered from different problems like tree thefts/illegal logging, conflicts 
between Perhutani and local people, agricultural encroachment in the forests, and 
tenure claims to the forestland (Table 1). The primary field data was drawn from in-
terviews, discussions, and other information from various stakeholders such as the 
respective district forest managers and forest officers, the leaders of the LMDHs, and 
other relevant stakeholders. The interviews were complemented by reviews of scien-
tific literature and PHBM regulations.
3   This forest user group has to be formally registered by the legal office, usually at the district level.
Table 1: Forest Management Related Problems at the Research Sites
Source: Author’s Compilation
VillAgE
Gempol
Gembyungan
Temulus
Glandang
Burat
Mayungsari
Sedayu
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FoREST DiSTRicT
Randublatung
Randublatung
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South Kedu
South Kedu
South Kedu
South Kedu
×
×
×
×
×
×
×
×
×
×
×
×
×
×
×
×
×
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Empirical Findings
To restore control over forest resources in the PHBM programmes, Perhutani estab-
lishes regulatory frameworks and conditions for the community forestry practices 
through which the company is able to force local people to act according to its de-
sires. This section discusses the administrative procedures used by Perhutani to exert 
control over forest resources.
Regulated in the Decision of Perhutani’s Board of Directors No. 136/KPTS/DIR/2001, 
PHBM is preceded by the signing of a legal agreement between the forest office – 
usually at the district level – and a formally-registered LMDH. Article 5 (1-b) of the 
Decision reads: “To implement PHBM, Perhutani prioritises LMDHs that have been 
formally registered at a legal office and are recommended by their respective village 
leaders” (own translation). 
While all villages studied in this research have already created such a group, a 
clear example of the power of this administrative procedure is provided by the case 
of Temulus. In this village, interest in community forestry has been evident since the 
end of the 1990s, however, the PHBM was only approved after the establishment of 
a formally-registered LMDH group in 2010 (Maryudi, 2011). The forest officials of the 
three forest districts suggested that this requirement ensures the legal enforceability 
of the PHBM agreement (see also Djajanti, 2006). The administrative screening is fur-
ther enhanced by the fact that Perhutani can determine whether particular groups 
are qualified for the participation in the PHBM agreement. Officials in the three for-
est districts are expected to have a ‘good partner’ in managing the forests. They 
anticipated that the LMDHs actively and cooperatively participate in the PHBM, sug-
gesting that they will not undermine Perhutani’s interests. In most cases, the forest 
offices facilitated the creation of the LMDHs to make them more reliant and inclined 
to Perhutani. In contrast, the people from Benowo and Temulus villages were heavily 
influenced by a local NGO, much to the chagrin of the respective forest offices (see 
Maryudi & Krott, 2012a). In Temulus, the forest district office ignored the local group 
working with the NGO and created an LMDH composed of more supportive villagers 
to implement PHBM.
Through a legal contract, the forest office can exert some degree of control over 
the participating user group as contracts usually articulate the “principal’s prefer-
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ences and priorities” (Shapiro, 1987, p. 632). In the PHBM agreements with the LM-
DHs investigated for this research, Perhutani clearly aspires to limit local communi-
ties’ (forest users and their groups) access to the state forestland and associated 
resources. The agreement itself was prepared by the respective forest district offices 
as indicated by the identical content and wording for different LMDHs. It is carefully 
narrated with administrative procedures to limit the access of local people to the 
forestland and its resources. 
State ownership of forestland is one of the main elements of the forest admin-
istration to restore control over forest resources that is agreed upon in the PHBM 
agreement. In fact, the participating LMDHs are forced to acknowledge the state’s 
ownership of forestland, which ignores the (customary) tenure claims of local com-
munities to the forestland (Maryudi, 2011). Article 6 of Decision No. 136/KPTS/DIR/2001 
reads: “PHBM is implemented without changing the status of the state forestland” 
(own translation). This fact was duly accepted by all LMDHs in the PHBM agreements 
that state that “the tenure ownership of the forestland is assigned to the state, which 
has mandated the management of the forestland to Perhutani” (own translation). 
The preferences and priorities of Perhutani are further emphasised in the permit 
systems (allowable and non-allowable regimes) that regulate forest users’ use and 
access rights to forests. The PHBM agreement clearly reinforces the dominant nar-
rative of the state’s control and possession of forest products as it outlaws tree cut-
ting and grazing on young forest stands. Local people are only permitted to collect 
non-timber products such as edible fruits, mushrooms, and fodders (Djajanti, 2006; 
Maryudi, 2009). 
The administrative procedures for ensuring control are further enhanced through 
management plans and reporting activities. In community forestry programmes, LM-
DHs are invited to develop so-called management plans, which unfortunately only 
relate to permitted forest uses, such as the use of the forest floor for agricultural 
cropping. Usually, the groups are provided with a planning sheet, which outlines 
the agricultural crops that are allowed to be planted and indicates where and when 
these crops are permitted to be planted. This procedure can serve as a screening 
mechanism for the forest office to instantly prevent misconduct in the forests. A 
forest officer in Randublatung forest district suggested that some crops such as rice 
and bananas are prohibited as they would mimic private paddy fields and gardens ASEAS 5(2)
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respectively, which are perceived to encourage tenure claims in the future. Some 
local groups also failed in their attempt to propose activities such as planting trees, 
coffee, and other perennial crops that were considered to impede the growth of the 
main forest species. 
Administrative procedures may increase the likelihood that the agent’s policy ac-
tions mirror the principal’s interests (McCubbins et al., 1987, p. 262). In PHBM com-
munity forestry, Perhutani enriches the bureaucracy by urging LMDHs to craft their 
own forest regulations to guarantee that forest practices serve Perhutani’s desired 
outcomes. In most cases, the creation of local regulations has been heavily influ-
enced by the forest office and appears to enhance its administrative procedures since 
they are simply copied from the PHBM agreement (Maryudi, 2011). In fact, combined 
with the PHBM agreement, the local forest regulations create a so-called “two-tier 
permit system” (Maryudi, 2011) that links local forest users with the forest adminis-
tration through permits (see Figure 1).
The formal agreement between the forest office and the LMDHs further specifies 
both the responsibilities for forest activities and the sanctions that are to be im-
posed in cases of forest misconduct of the participating LMDHs. As mentioned above, 
PHBM encourages the active participation of local communities in forest manage-
ment and conservation activities. Through the programme, Perhutani expects that 
communities contribute to reforestation, and the agreement obliges the group com-
Figure 1: The Two-Tier Permit System in the Java community Forestry System 
Source: Adapted from Maryudi, 2011, p. 59
FoREST ADMiniSTRATion
coMMuniTy
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DEciSion MAking ETc.
gRouP conSTiTuTion
(STATuTES, by-lAwS AnD 
oThER inTERnAl RulES)
PERMiTS
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FoREST uSERS
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mittees/leaders to ensure high survival rates of the planted seedlings at a minimum 
of 90 percent. Newly reforested areas are parceled out to interested forest users 
for agricultural cropping for about two to three years. In return, they are obliged to 
plant prescribed tree seedlings and nurture them. When the people fail to reach the 
survival target, they are obliged to replant the forestland. This is particularly impor-
tant for addressing the problems of reforestation failure that often occured prior to 
the implementation of the PHBM. Perhutani is also concerned about valuable timber. 
Through the PHBM programme, the company aspires to secure the tree stands. It 
therefore imposes heavy sanctions in cases where the forest’s potential to produce 
timber is reduced. In all cases observed in this research, people are expected to ac-
tively participate in forest patrols to prevent illegal logging. To ensure this, the forest 
offices threaten to terminate the agreement upon the discovery of illegal cutting.
Given these restrictions, questions may remain about the degree to which the ex-
tensive administrative procedures and regulations work on the ground. Within the 
PHBM programmes, Perhutani has created mechanisms of extended control, most no-
tably through the use of LMDH committees, to deliver its interests. In other cases, 
scholars (e.g. Dasgupta & Beard, 2007; Thoms, 2008; Varughese & Ostrom, 2001,) have 
noted the influence of local elites, such as village leaders or people from high castes, on 
the groups and their ability to control the group members. In this study, the influence 
of local elites such as village leaders, civil servants, teachers, and religious leaders, is 
also visible across the research cases. These people usually dominate the structure of 
the group committee and the decision making in the group, and also capture most of 
the benefits obtained from PHBM (Maryudi, 2011). For Perhutani, controlling the com-
mittees can mean control over the group members and their activities in the forests. 
In this regard, the administrative procedures are manifested by the attachment of a 
forest officer, albeit indirectly, as an adviser on the committee structure of all LMDHs. 
While greater control over the forests can be achieved, Perhutani benefits from re-
duced costs, which are transferred to the group committees as a consequence. 
Perhutani greatly benefits from the participation of group committees, which 
play the role of ‘forest-keepers’. In cases of forest users’ misconduct, the group com-
mittees adopt different strategies depending on the severity of the forest violation. 
Persuasion is employed as a common strategy – particularly for minor misconduct – 
but heavy and persistent misconduct can lead to severe punishments. In Benowo and ASEAS 5(2)
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Sedayu villages, for instance, the committees adopt so-called ‘peer-controls’ whereby 
a forest user is promised 30 percent of the fines obtained from his/her fellow users 
who are caught infringing upon the regulations. In Sedayu, some group members 
have been ejected from the group due to persistent infringement.
Conclusion
This paper reveals that the PHBM programme is systematically set up to ensure that 
forestland and resources are kept under tight control of the state through numerous 
administrative procedures. These administrative procedures are manifested in the obli-
gation of legal registration of LMDHs, the use of formal agreements and contracts that 
are biased toward Perhutani’s priorities, and the use of local forest regulations. The in-
formal agenda associated with the implementation of community forestry is veiled in 
a scheme that supposedly (formally) serves the interests of local people. Through the 
use of group committees, Perhutani has additionally produced an effective mechanism 
of surveillance in the forests, whereby the forest office no longer has to directly con-
trol forest activities, and thus lifts the burden of supervision in this area from its own 
responsibilities. Consequently, signs of forest order emerge. While more empirically-
based case studies are indeed required to provide more solid justification, local people 
in the studied villages are clearly experiencing increased control. 
This conclusion by no means advocates ‘no control’ in the forests that might have 
contraproductive consequences with regard to the condition of forest resources. In-
stead, the challenge that lies ahead is to create better instruments that can integrate 
the interests of Perhutani to improve the forest conditions and the needs of local com-
munities for meaningful benefits from the forests. The participation of local people in 
forest conservation and management should be met with genuine attempts to improve 
their livelihood and quality of life. In PHBM, the legal access to the forests is astonish-
ingly limited and across the studied villages, the programme has yet to lift local people 
from their chronic poverty (Maryudi & Krott, 2012b). Here, a much improved legal 
access to the forest by local people is the key of the future implementation of PHBM. 
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